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R
ecently, several federal agencies, including the Federal
Reserve, FDIC, and Treasury, have created numerous pro-
grams to support credit flows.1 Some analysts have criticized
these programs as “scattershot,” as lacking focus, or as desperate
attempts to be perceived as “doing something.”2 Others have argued
that care must be taken so that these programs do not violate Walter
Bagehot’s maxim that central banks must lend only against good
collateral and at penalty rates (Thornton, 2008). Here, I argue that
these programs are appropriate and consistent with lessons learned
from two centuries of monetary history.
Macroeconomists continue to find use in Bagehot’s Lombard
Street (1873), a book that prescribed behavioral rules for the Bank
of England when Great Britain had no statutory central bank but the
Bank held the nation’s gold reserve and special statutory authority
to issue banknotes. Bagehot’s principal message was that the first
task of a central bank during a financial panic is to end the panic—
a message that remains true today. He defined a panic, in his day,
as a period when the public wished to hold only gold coin, bullion,
or Bank of England banknotes. Quelling a panic required satisfying
the public’s demand for these risk-free liquid assets. It was the prac-
tice of the Bank to lend aggressively during panics, and several
times before his writing the Bank had nearly exhausted its reserves.
Further, lending could not always be against “good” collateral
since the panic itself harmed the market value of assets. Bagehot
advised a lending rate sufficiently high to avoid exhausting the
Bank’s reserves and adequate collateral to ensure that the Bank,
a private institution, would not itself become insolvent.3
The applicability of Bagehot’s advice is limited today. Modern
central banks in fiat money economies do not face the constraints
that concerned Bagehot—their right to issue high-powered money
cannot be exhausted, nor can they become insolvent. Modern
research suggests, instead, two pieces of advice. The first is that
panics tend to follow periods of increasing asymmetric information
between borrowers and lenders, leading to an underpricing of risk
associated with new financial securities and instruments. During
the panic, information becomes more uniform, asset prices change,
and some lenders/investors become insolvent. The central bank’s
role is to assist markets in this price discovery process by keeping
them as orderly as possible. This mechanism has been explored
by Kindleberger (1978), Mishkin (1991), Neal (1998), and others.
The second piece of advice is that preserving the banking system
through the panic is essential because banking firms, more so than
other institutions, process private information and monitor borrowers.
Sustaining the banking firms does not preclude imposing losses
on the firms’ owners and debtors, but maintaining the firms may
require lending on questionable collateral. Friedman and Schwartz
(1963) argue that such efforts during the Great Depression were
inadequate, and they quote approvingly Bagehot’s summary of how
the Bank of England halted history’s first modern financial panic
(Lombard Street, pp. 51-52):
The way in which the panic of 1825 was stopped by advancing
money has been described in so broad and graphic a way that the
passage has become classical. “We lent it,” said Mr. Harman [a senior
director] on behalf of the Bank of England, “by every possible means
and in modes we have never adopted before; we took in stock on secu-
rity, we purchased Exchequer bills, we made advances on Exchequer
bills, we not only discounted outright, but we made advances on the
deposit of bills of exchange to an immense amount, in short, by every
possible means consistent with the safety of the Bank, and we were
not on some occasions over-nice [to borrowers].”
It is clear in the historical record that the Federal Reserve’s founders
expected all Fed lending to be repaid; doing otherwise would be to
conduct fiscal rather than monetary policy. Further, Bagehot’s first
advice to central banks remains: In a financial panic, quell the panic
by every possible means, mindful that an effective monetary policy
during a panic cannot be risk free.
—Richard G. Anderson
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1 A summary and timeline are available at http://www.stlouisfed.org/timeline/.
2 Examples include Leonhardt (2008) and the testimony of Mark Zandi, chief
economist of Moody’s Economy.com, before the U.S. Senate Budget Committee,
November 19, 2008.
3 The Bank of England at this time was a private bank with shareholders and dividend
payments. 
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